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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The McBrides, Petitioners/Respondents ("McBrides"), did 
not file a cross-appeal, so are barred from pursuing any cross-
assignment of error or claim for relief beyond affirmation of the 
lower court's decision. Utah law on that issue has been well-
settled for many years. The Court should not review the record, 
grant relief, or in any way consider the McBride's cross-
assignments of error. 
The district court correctly applied the 1987 Recovery 
Fund Act to this case, inasmuch as the petition against the 
Recovery Fund was filed in May 1988, while the 1987 statute was 
in effect. The McBrides urge the Court to apply the 1985 
Recovery Fund statute to this case, because that statute was in 
effect when their cause of action against Steven R. Carter 
("Carter") arose. However, as important as the underlying 
judgment against Carter is to this case, it is the cause of 
action against the Recovery Fund which should determine which 
statute applies to the petition. The cause of action against the 
Fund did not arise until the judgment against Carter was clearly 
uncollectible, apparently in May 1988. 
The Utah Division of Real Estate ("Division") is only 
subrogated to the portion of a judgment actually paid out of the 
Recovery Fund. The petitioner reserves all rights to the 
remainder of the judgment, including attorney's fees, costs, 
punitive damages, and any amount in excess of $10,000. 
There is ongoing concern by the Division and the Utah 
Real Estate Commission ("Commission") that the Recovery Fund 
remain viable and capable of providing at least partial relief to 
those having qualifying claims against the Recovery Fund. The 
fees have been raised in an attempt to accomplish that end. The 
Fund is not the panacea that the McBrides see it as being, but 
was created to provide a measure of relief to those injured by 
defaulting real estate licensees, up to the statutory limit of 
$10,000 per transaction. 
The McBrides' claim that the underlying judgment 
against Carter is res judicata against the Division on the issue 
of whether or not Carter's fraudulent acts constituted 
transactions is itself barred by their failure to bring a cross-
appeal. However, the Division has not requested that the Supreme 
Court change the underlying judgment, but simply look at it and 
see that it's characterization of Carter's acts as "transactions" 
is inconsistent with the Findings of Fact, and that those "five 
transactions of fraud" are certainly not real estate transactions 
as contemplated in the Recovery Fund statute. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
NO CROSS APPEAL WAS FILED, THEREFORE THE ONLY RELIEF 
THE MCBRIDES MAY REQUEST IS AFFIRMATION OF THE DISTRICT COURT'S 
ORDER. 
The McBrides did not file a cross-appeal claiming error 
on the part of the trial court, and are therefore barred from 
raising any issue not raised by the Division's appeal or from 
making any prayer for relief other than affirmation of the trial 
court's order. 
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It has been the law in Utah for many years that 
respondents must file a cross-appeal in order to pursue any 
cross-assignment of error or modification of the lower court's 
decision. As the Utah Supreme Court held in Hartford Accident & 
Indemnity Co. v. Cleqg, 135 P.2d 919, 103 Utah 414 at 426, "No 
affirmative relief can be granted to respondent, even if he were 
entitled to such, because no cross-appeal has been filed." In 
that same decision, the Court quoted from Jensen v. Utah Railway 
Co., 270 P. 349 at 361, 72 Utah 366 at 398. 
This court, in a number of cases, considering the 
purpose and function of cross-assignments has held that 
cross-assignments cannot avail the respondent to have 
the record reviewed, to afford him a modification of 
the judgment or any affirmative relief, and that to 
review a record for such purpose, and to grant such 
relief, a cross-appeal is essential, and assignments 
made thereon in the same manner as on the appeal by the 
appellant, and that cross-assignments perform the 
office and function of only defending and upholding the 
j udgment. (Empha sis added.) 
Inasmuch as Petitioners/Respondents failed to file a 
cross-appeal as provided for by Rule 4(d) of the Rules of the 
Utah Supreme Court, the Court should not consider the following 
issues raised in the Petitioners/Respondents' brief: 
1. Whether the underlying judgment against Carter is 
res judicata on the issue of whether or not Carter 
committed five fraudulent "transactions" or acts. 
2. Whether the McBrides are entitled to collect 
attorney's fees and costs from the Recovery Fund. 
3. Whether the McBrides are entitled to have the 
District Court's Order upheld for reasons other than 
those expressed by the court in it's Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order. 
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POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE STATUTE 
GOVERNING THIS CASE WAS THE REAL ESTATE RESEARCH AND RECOVERY 
FUND ACT IN EFFECT AT THE TIME THE MCBRIDE'S PETITION AGAINST THE 
FUND WAS FILED. 
The McBrides would have this Court apply two different 
Recovery Fund statutes to the issues raised in their brief. The 
McBrides support their arguments with whichever version of the 
statute best supports the argument. The relevant sections of the 
two statutes are as follows: 
§ 61-2a-5(l) [Effective April 29, 1985] 
61-2a-4. JUDGMENT AGAINST REAL ESTATE LICENSE -
FRAUD, MISREPRESENTATION, OR DECEIT - VERIFIED 
PETITION FOR ORDER DIRECTING PAYMENT FROM FUND -
LIMITATIONS AND PROCEDURE. 
(1) If any person obtains a final judgment in a 
court of competent jurisdiction against a real 
estate licensee in this state, based upon fraud, 
misrepresentation, or deceit in any real estate 
transaction, that person may, upon termination of 
all proceedings including appeals, file a verified 
petition in the court where the judgment was 
entered for an order directing payment from the 
Real Estate Education, Research, and Recovery Fund 
for the actual damages included in the judgment 
and unpaid, but not more than $10,000. Recovery 
from the fund shall be for the actual damages 
included in the judgment and unpaid, but not more 
than $10,000 for a single transaction and no more 
than $50,000 for any one licensee. 
§ 61-2a-5(l) [Effective April 27, 1987] 
61-2a-5. JUDGMENT AGAINST REAL ESTATE LICENSEE -
FRAUD, MISREPRESENTATION, OR DECEIT - VERIFIED 
PETITION FOR ORDER DIRECTING PAYMENT FROM FUND -
LIMITATIONS AND PROCEDURE. 
(1) A Person may bring a claim against the 
Real Estate Education, Research, and Recovery Fund 
only if he provides written notice to the Division 
of Real Estate at the time he files an action 
against a real estate licensee alleging fraud, 
- 4 -
misrepresentation, or deceit. Within 30 days of 
receipt of the notice, the Division shall have an 
unconditional right to intervene in the action. 
If the person making a claim against the fund 
obtains a final judgment in a court of competent 
jurisdiction in this state against the licensee 
based upon fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit in 
any real estate transaction, the person making the 
claim may, upon termination of all proceedings 
including appeals, file a verified petition in the 
court where the judgment was entered for an order 
directing payment from the Real Estate Education, 
Research, and Recovery Fund for the uncollected 
actual damages included in the judgment and 
unpaid. Recovery from the fund may not include 
punitive damages, attorney's fees, interest, or 
court costs. No recovery from the fund may be 
more than $10,000 for a single transaction and no 
more than $50,000 for any one licensee. 
As the Court can see, there are substantial and 
significant differences between these two sections. 
The McBrides use the 1987 statute, the one applied by 
the district court, when they argue that the Division should be 
barred from addressing the underlying judgment against Carter 
because notice was given to the Division as required by the 
statute. They also claim that the Division could have exercised 
its "unconditional right to intervene in the action" against 
Carter, (p. 20, Respondent's Brief) However, there were no such 
provisions in the law at the time the McBrides were engaged in 
litigation with Carter. The judgment against Carter was entered 
on January 27, 1987, and the 1987 statute did not go into effect 
until April 27, 1987. Laws of Utah 1987, chapter 48 section 11. 
While the McBrides attempt to take advantage of some 
perceived advantage the 1987 statute gives them in the above 
argument, they turn around and argue that the 1985 statute, 
rather than the 1987 statute should apply to this case because 
_ s _ 
their cause of action against Carter arose in January 1986. The 
issue of which statute applies does not turn on when the cause of 
action against Carter arose, but rather, when did the cause of 
action against the Recovery Fund arise? That cause of action 
arose when it became apparent that the judgment against Carter 
was uncollectible. Apparently the McBrides' cause of action 
against the Recovery Fund arose in May 1988 when the petition was 
filed. Therefore, the 1987 statute which was in effect at that 
time should govern this claim. 
POINT III 
PAYMENT FROM THE RECOVERY FUND SUBROGATES THE FUND TO 
ONLY THAT PORTION OF THE JUDGMENT ACTUALLY PAID, THEREBY LEAVING 
THE MCBRIDES WITH THE RIGHT TO COLLECT THE BALANCE OF THEIR 
JUDGMENT-INCLUDING THEIR COSTS, ATTORNEY'S FEES AND PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES-FROM CARTER. 
As was stated in the Division's original brief, the 
Recovery Fund was not established to provide total compensation 
to victims of defaulting real estate licensees, but was 
established to provide at least partial relief up to $10,000 per 
real estate transaction. Had the Legislature intended the Fund 
to provide total compensation to every injured party, it most 
certainly would have enacted a statute which did not contain 
maximum limits of recovery, and would not have set forth specific 
conditions precedent to filing a petition against the fund. It 
would have also had to appropriate state monies for such a fund, 
inasmuch as the real estate profession could not possibly self-
fund such an undertaking. 
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The McBrides espouse a claim that it would be 
economically infeasible for potential Recovery Fund claimants to 
prosecute lawsuits if they could only hope to recover a maximum 
of $10,000 per real estate transaction from the Fund. Again, the 
Recovery Fund is not the panacea that the McBrides see it as 
being. The Recovery Fund confers a benefit, albeit a limited 
one, on the judgment creditors of defaulting real estate 
licensees that the judgment creditors of other debtors do not 
have. Unlike judgment creditors dealing with non-licensees, the 
judgment creditor in a qualifying real estate transaction has the 
opportunity to actually recover up to $10,000 of the money lost 
because of fraud, misrepresentation or deceit in the transaction. 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-2a-9 of the 1987 statute provided 
that the Division shall be subrogated to the rights of the 
judgment creditor for the amount of the judgment paid out of the 
Fund. It also provided that payment from the fund on behalf of a 
licensee would automatically revoke that license until the fund 
was repaid in full. The balance of the judgment after 
subrogation by the Division, should there be any portion which 
would not qualify for payment out of the fund, such as attorney's 
fees, costs, interest, punitive damages, or an amount in excess 
of the $10,000 per transaction limit, remains with the claimant. 
Payment from the Recovery Fund does not extinguish any rights the 
judgment creditor has against the debtor/licensee, it simply 
transfers to the fund subrogation rights equal to the amount paid 
out, and does not effect the right of the creditor to continue to 
pursue the licensee for the balance of the judgment. 
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Contrary to the McBrides' claim, the viability of the 
Recovery Fund is a matter of continuing concern to the Division 
and the Utah Real Estate Commission. Counsel for the McBrides, 
quoting a five year old article in the Utah Real Estate News, 
would have the court believe that there are currently few claims 
against the Recovery Fund, and that the fund is so large that 
there is plenty of money for the recoveries he endorses. 
However, the current status of the fund is more accurately 
reflected by a notice in the March 1989 edition of the Utah Real 
Estate News which states in part, under the heading "INCREASE IN 
RECOVERY FUND FEE-Effective June 1, 1989": "Because of the 
increase in the number of claims against the Fund, the Real 
Estate Commission has recently voted to increase the amount of 
money going into the fund to the maximum allowed." The fees 
will be raised to the statutory limit of $18 per year for 
brokers, and $12 per year for salesagents. 
Surely, the Division and the Real Estate Commission are 
in a much better position than anyone else to judge the ability 
of the fund to handle the pending and anticipated claims against 
the Recovery Fund, inasmuch as they are privy to the volume, 
nature, and time frame in which such claims may be filed. Since 
April 1987 the Division has been receiving notice of potential 
claims, and is often involved in disciplinary proceedings which 
indicate potential claims. 
The McBrides also argue that they are entitled to 
collect attorney's fees and costs from the Recovery Fund. They 
are barred from raising this claim because of the lack of a 
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cross-appeal. However, the district court correctly held that 
the 1987 Recovery Fund Statute did not allow recovery of 
attorney's fees and costs from the fund. The McBrides' argument 
that the "third-party tort rule" found in South Sanpitch Co. v. 
Pack, 97 Utah Adv. Rep. 42 (Filed December 13, 1988), applies, is 
irrelevant to this case because the petition against the recovery 
fund is clearly not an action to quiet title. South Sanpitch may 
have been relevant to the case against Carter, but has no 
relevance to a claim against the Recovery Fund which arises due 
to the uncollectibility of the Carter judgment. 
The McBrides also present a most unfortunate, and 
false, scenario to the Court in an attempt to counter the 
Division's interpretation of the Recovery Fund Statute. On page 
16 of Respondent's brief, they use the example of a "commercial 
high rise of 200-300 offices" listed for sale or lease with a 
real estate licensee. Counsel would have this Court believe that 
if "100 prospective buyers or tenants" gave deposits to a 
licensee who converted it to his personal use, "then under the 
Division's interpretation of the statute, since only one parcel 
of real property is involved and since there was only one listing 
agreement, the 100 victims could only recover a total of only 
$10,000 or $100 each." This is a mischaracterization of the 
Division's position. Using the Petitioner/Respondents' 
scenario — they have described a situation where there are 200-
300 parcels of real property, i.e. condominiums under UCA § 57-8-
1, et seq. If 100 purchasers or tenants enter into real estate 
transactions handled through the licensee, there is certainly the 
possibility for 100 claims against the Recovery Fund, depending 
on how many real estate transactions are involved. If those 100 
people turned out to be 50 married couples purchasing 50 
condominiums, then there are 50 potential claims because there 
are 50 transactions. Each of those 50 claims would be limited to 
a maximum recovery of $10,000, and once the $50,000.00 ceiling 
was reached, the Fund could not pay out any more money on behalf 
of that licensee. 
POINT IV 
THE DIVISION IS NOT BARRED BY RES JUDICATA, OR ANT 
OTHER LEGAL THEORY FROM ASKING THIS COURT TO FIND THAT THE TERM 
-TRANSACTION" AS USED IN THE UNDERLYING JUDGMENT IS NOT A REAL 
ESTATE TRANSACTION AS CONTEMPLATED BY THE RECOVERY FUND STATUTE. 
The McBrides present a res judicata argument in an 
attempt to keep the Court from addressing one of the pivotal 
issues in this case, namely defining a real estate transaction. 
The Court is not being asked to change the underlying judgment, 
simply to interpret it. The underlying judgment against Carter 
describes certain acts committed by Carter which constituted 
fraud and misrepresentation (R.101, no. 5). In the Conclusions 
of Law and Judgment these acts are called "five transactions of 
fraud and misrepresentation" and reference back to paragraph 5, 
6, and 7 of the Findings of Fact. There is no refercmce to 
"transactions" in those paragraphs, but only reference to the 
court's finding at least five fraudulent acts by the 
defendant(Carter). The term "transaction" only appears in the 
Conclusion of Law and Judgment drafted by Mr. Miles in the 
default proceeding. Calling the unilateral acts described in the 
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Findings of Facts Htransactions" does not make them transactions, 
let alone real estate transactions as referenced in UCA § 61-2a-
5(1). 
The Division has a duty to challenge any part of the 
underlying judgment which does not meet the statutory 
requirements established as conditions precedent to recovery from 
the Fund, and the Division owes a duty to licensees and potential 
claimants to oppose overpayments from the fund. The Division 
simply does not see how calling a series of unilateral acts 
performed by a real estate licensee "transactions" turns those 
acts into the commonly accepted notion of a real estate 
transaction. Real estate transactions are give and take affairs, 
involving negotiations, buying and selling, or attempts to buy 
and sell between parties. Ballentine's Law Dictionary, Third 
Edition, defines transaction as: 
"A Matter of dealing between parties, the word 
implying action, consent, knowledge, or 
acquiescence on the part of both of them. An 
act or agreement, or several acts or agreements 
having connection with each other, in which two 
or more persons are concerned and by which legal 
relations between them are altered." 
The McBrides argue that the case of Dombalian v. Fox, 
152 Cal. Rptr. 86, 88 Cal. App. 3d 763 (1979), does not support 
the Division's argument because the California Recovery Fund 
Statute was not identical to the Utah statute. Of course, there 
are some differences between the two states' statutes, however 
both statutes have similar functions and the procedures which 
trigger the statute's effect are very similar. The Division 
offers Dombalian to the Court as a very reasonable, workable, and 
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sensible definition of what a real estate transaction is. The 
court in Dombalian said: 
"Transaction" is a word of flexible meaning. 
It may comprehend a series of many occurrences, 
depending not so much upon the immediateness of 
their connection as upon their logical relation-
ship. . . 
[1] As amorphous as the word is, we should be 
going against its grain were we to hold that each 
separate event involving a listing agreement for 
a single piece of property involved a different 
transaction. And the Legislature has made it 
plain that the grain is not to be resisted. 
CONCLUSION 
The McBrides paint the Division as being niggardly and 
represent to the Court that "it is conceivable that the Division 
could . . . have the statute amended to exclude such claims from 
recovery in the year or more it may take to prosecutes the claims 
to judgment . . . " This statement by the Petitioners/Respondents 
is patently offensive and wrong. The Division gladly pays 
qualifying claims. The few cases which have to be contested in 
court are the cases which make claims beyond the limits 
established in the statute, or which have underlying judgments 
which cannot serve as the basis for recovery. As the record in 
this case clearly demonstrates, the Division has always 
maintained that the McBrides are entitled to recover $10,000. 
The McBrides have filed no cross-appeal and are not entitled to 
make any assignments of error or request for relief beyond 
affirmation of the District Court's decision. The Court should 
not consider their arguments which go beyond the issues raised by 
the Division on appeal. 
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Therefore, the Division prays the court reverse the 
order of the District Court, and remand the case for entry of 
judgment in the amount of $10,000.00. 
Respectfully submitted this 31 day of May, 1989. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
c\^ 
IE I LA PAGE 
Assistant Attdrriey General 
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